Australia first signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974 and acceded to the Additional Protocols in 1998. Together, the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocols provide the IAEA with the necessary powers and freedom of action to carry out its verification mandate. In particular, the IAEA is able to request the necessary information from the Government and to monitor and verify Australia`s civilian nuclear programme by conducting short-term inspections and additional access visits and by taking environmental samples as required. With nuclear-powered submarines at least a decade away for the Australian Military, the AUKUS Pact is likely to bring both opportunities and challenges as participating countries calibrate their next steps. The agreement builds on existing U.S. commitments to Australia and was received as a signal of Washington`s willingness to take stronger action in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, AUKUS risks encouraging other non-nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear propulsion capabilities that could undermine the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by promoting the enrichment of the HEU. American opponents, for their part, condemned AUKUS. China, which many observers see as the main driver of the deal, condemned the escalation of the pact and warned that there would be a regional arms race. North Korea has repeated China, warning that Australia`s actions could trigger a nuclear arms race, while former Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif criticized the alleged hypocrisy of the three countries for reaching a deal that increased the HEU. The Americans, British and Australians did not react immediately to the French outrage.
When announcing the AUKUS deal during a tripartite video conference with President Joe Biden and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Prime Minister Morrison made no mention of France or the 2016 agreement. France is also outraged that it was not even informed or consulted about the decision and the new agreement before they were announced. Describing the UK as a junior partner and vassal of the US because of the pact, Beaune said in an interview: “Our British friends told us they would leave the EU to create a global Britain. We can see that this is a return to the American and a form of accepted vassalization. [112] Le Drian said, “We recalled our ambassadors to [Canberra and Washington] to reassess the situation. With Britain, this is not necessary. We know their constant opportunism. It is therefore not necessary to bring our ambassador back to explain it. [113] A Franco-British summit on defence was cancelled.
[114] However, this decision raised some concerns. During the discussion of the agreement in the House of Representatives, MPs wondered whether the inclination towards the Indo-Pacific could divert attention from the security needs of the Euro-Atlantic. Keir Starmer, the leader of the opposition, said: “Whatever the merits of an Indo-Pacific inclination, maintaining security in Europe must remain our main objective.” Meanwhile, Britain`s new foreign secretary, Liz Truss, defended the deal in an article for the Sunday Telegraph, saying it showed Britain`s willingness to be “tenacious” in defending its interests. Critics like China have already begun warning of the risks the deal poses to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Iran could view such activities by a non-nuclear-weapon State as a justification for its own nuclear submarine ambitions and exploit this loophole to keep the HEU out of IAEA observers or to engage in difficult trade in possible resumption of talks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As AUKUS takes shape over the next 18 months, U.S. technology exchanges and the accompanying IAEA safeguards system are likely to play an important role in addressing international proliferation concerns related to the agreement. Currently, only six countries – all nuclear-weapon states – have nuclear-powered submarine capabilities. These include five SIGNATORIES TO THE NPT (united States, United Kingdom, Russia, China and France) and India. The United States stationed its first nuclear-powered submarine, the USS Nautilus, in 1955 and shared the technology with the United Kingdom shortly thereafter as part of a mutual defense agreement still in effect today. Over the decades, the United States` nuclear propulsion capabilities have improved significantly.
While the USS Nautilus had a nuclear nucleus that lasted about 62,000 miles, today`s atomic nuclei continue to operate for more than 1 million miles. This, in turn, means that nuclear-powered submarines have the ability to remain at sea for several months, limited solely by the crew`s food supplies and endurance. In 2019, Australia signed a strategic partnership agreement with the Naval Group to design and build twelve submarines to be built in Australia. [24] [25] However, the project was plagued by delays and cost overruns, resulting in uncertainty and tension behind the scenes. T92 [26] Revised costs, including inflation over the life of the programme, amounted to A$90 billion (€56 billion). [27] India and Japan – both are members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the United States. . . .
