With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies at the national, non-sectarian level, a new Senate was established in which all religious communities were represented and whose power was limited to the highest national concerns. As for the relationship between the legislative and executive branches, the Washington administration has set institutional precedents that have been pursued with such consistency over the centuries that they now dominate our understanding of Article II. For the uninitiated reader, one might think that the treaty clause implies that treaties are the only instrument authorized to formalize the nation`s international obligations, or that the Senate, because of its role as “counsel and consent,” would be a full partner of presidents in negotiating treaties. This is not the case either. The Washington and Adams administrations used executive agreements without Senate approval both to arrange the delivery of international mail and to settle claims arising from the seizure of a U.S. ship by a Dutch privateer. Such agreements, sometimes pursued unilaterally and sometimes with legal authority, are now far superior to treaties as instruments of international engagement. With respect to the treaties themselves, when the Senate did not immediately advise Washington on the peace negotiations between Georgia and the Creek Indians, the Senate established the now uniform practice of submitting to the Senate for approval only treaties that had already been concluded. From a multi-community society, Lebanon has thus been transformed into a multi-community state system. Sociological reality, which was relatively neutral at first, was used by the founders of Lebanese politics to become the main consideration of their political order. To paraphrase the Marxist formula regarding social classes and their formation, the adoption of political sectarianism in Lebanon could be seen as similar to the transition from a group (or community) per se to a group (or community) for its own sake. After that, the culture of political sectarianism gradually became entrenched in the collective consciousness and practice of Lebanon`s political and social elites. From the Shiite strongholds of Nabatiyeh and Tyre to the Sunni cities of Tripoli and Saida, protesters are demanding a change in their corrupt political class, dominated by sectarian warlords who waged a bloody 15-year civil war that ended with the 1989 Taif Accord.
This power-sharing agreement was awarded by government agencies to the country`s various religious groups. But after thirty years, it has deepened the country`s identity politics to the detriment of representation and good governance, leading to paralysis. Many in Lebanon and abroad recognize the need for new elections, but this is not enough. This moment offers a rare opportunity to end 200 years of sporadically violent sectarian politics and to support the demands of the Lebanese people for a more robust and representative democracy. In addition, Taif laid the foundations for privileged relations between Lebanon and Syria, with implications for the political environment of both countries. Of the three principles, the first two are the most relevant to this discussion of Lebanese sectarianism. .
