The interim EPA is a “stepping stone” agreement. This means that the EU and partner countries can deepen the agreement through “rendezvous” clauses that allow for further negotiations on trade-related issues such as services, competition, intellectual property, etc. Six ESA countries – Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe – concluded an Interim Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU at the end of 2007. The countries of the East African Community, with the exception of South Sudan, are members of the WTO. The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with West Africa covers goods and development cooperation. The EPA also provides for the possibility of further negotiations on sustainable development, services, investment and other trade-related issues in the future. The EU is implementing seven Economic Partnership Agreements with 32 partners, including 14 in Africa. The main objective of the EPAs is to mobilise trade and investment for sustainable development. The content of the agenda will be broadened, with agreements covering new topics such as services and investment.
However, it is important to recognise that such commendable campaigns by African civil society and business leaders can only partially mitigate the expected development impact of the EPA if there is no overall change in policy direction – and if the EU does not recognise the injustice of its trade agreements. It is therefore crucial that EU officials constantly remember their so-called promises to fight poverty in Africa while liaising with their African counterparts on the Cotonou successor agreement. EU officials must be repeatedly asked to listen to the persistent concerns that EPAs will undermine Africa`s sustainable development prospects – and that their dialogues with civil society and Aid for Trade initiatives are woefully inadequate. They must be asked to recognize that such initiatives cannot turn squaring the circle and unfair trade agreements into opportunities for development. Worryingly, however, a full renegotiation of the EPAs is currently not on the table, as the European Commission (2017; 2018) stubbornly insists that its trade agreements be in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. If the EU does not take its responsibility for poverty reduction seriously by rethinking the EPAs, any successor to Cotonou will be fatally undermined from the outset. The EU initialled an Economic Partnership Agreement with 16 West African countries; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The Cotonou Agreement offers the EU and ACP countries the opportunity to negotiate development-oriented free trade agreements, known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The EPAs are firmly anchored in the goals of sustainable development, human rights and development cooperation, which are at the heart of the Cotonou Agreement. The EPO contributes to improving the business climate between partners by providing a stable and forward-looking framework for businesses in South Africa and across Southern Africa. It helps boost bilateral and regional trade, creating new opportunities to achieve the objectives of the strategic partnership between South Africa and the EU. Through the AfCFTA agreement, African countries have committed to “lay the foundations for the establishment of a continental customs union at a later stage”, which increasingly involves harmonizing policies in a number of areas, including tariffs, intellectual property rights, competition policy, investment and digital trade.
The EU`s trade relations with ACP countries are governed by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the EU, its Member States and acp countries, signed in 2000. While this comprehensive political, economic and development partnership expires in 2020, the parties are currently negotiating a successor agreement (the so-called post-Cotonou agreement). Overall, the literature on EU initiatives to promote “dialogue” and “participation” shows that African civil society actors and business representatives are denied a real chance to have a real impact on the content of EU trade and aid policy. Nevertheless, their presence at eu dialogue events plays an important role in helping the Commission to present its trade agenda as compatible with the legitimisation of development standards. In a recent article on the impact of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) on an EU-Africa trade agreement, Sean Woolfrey argues that while the AfCFTA is a good step forward in Africa`s integration efforts, it is too early to think that Africa is negotiating as a bloc with a partner like the European Union (EU). While we agree that a continent-to-continent agreement is not feasible in the short term, we argue that the EU`s trade policy towards Africa today significantly affects Africa`s ability to negotiate as a single entity tomorrow. However, the implementation of this commitment has been elusive. No institutions have been allowed to negotiate on behalf of the continent, and some countries are already actively negotiating trade agreements with third parties. We believe that this is due to misaligned and conflictual incentives applied to African countries and regional groupings. The EU`s trade policy towards Africa is now an important part of the problem. “Co-optation continues to manifest itself in the limited power granted to civil society groups in the eu`s trade policy. At EU level, despite the access granted to NGOs in the framework of the dialogue with civil society within DG Trade, these actors have not been able to really influence the results of trade policy.
A similar picture can be seen in the context of civil society mechanisms in EU trade agreements: while EU national and transnational mechanisms meet in practice, the participating civil society cannot articulate enforceable rules (Orbie, et al., 2017, p. 532).” As we noted in another article, while Africa could benefit from epas in some cases, the gains would be mainly concentrated on a few agricultural products (such as rice, milk and dairy products, sugar and meat) for countries that are not eligible for the Everything But Arms (EBA) system, which abolishes customs duties and quotas for exports to the EU (excluding arms). On the other hand, the increase in EU exports to Africa is much greater and better distributed among economic sectors, with the strongest growth in industrial products. In addition, strict EU requirements, especially for agricultural products (including sanitary and phytosanitary measures), limit the benefits of African agricultural exports to the EU market. In addition, the expected increase in African exports to the EU would be at the expense of potential intra-African trade. Firstly, the EU`s trade relations with Africa are very asymmetrical. Secondly, Africa accounts for only a very small share of EU imports and world trade. For a transition period, which can potentially be compared to the important steps in the implementation of the AfCFTA and the resulting benefits, a good argument can be made for the EU to reintroduce unilateral duty- and quota-free market access for all African countries with a uniform regime of “rules of origin”. This requires multilateral legitimacy through a new WTO waiver. As regards the Protocol on Rules of Origin, the EPA Committee decided in January 2020 to amend the term `originating product` in order to simplify and facilitate trade between the ESA region and the EU. The amendment, which entered into force in March 2020, allows economic operators, among others, to have greater flexibility while reducing costs.
The European Commission has repeatedly expressed its support for the AfCFTA, calling it “a step towards our long-term goal of a free trade area between Africa and the EU from one continent to another”. This will be supported by concrete efforts to strengthen and better target actions under the World Trade Organization`s Aid for Trade initiative to overcome supply-side constraints and provide financial and investment support, development and in a wide range of policy areas. However, Europe`s trade policy towards Africa remains at odds with the publicly stated intention to support the integration of the African continent led by the AfCFTA. Africa`s relations with the European Union (EU) come at a critical juncture as officials on both continents seek to conclude a successor treaty to the Cotonou Agreement (a trade and aid partnership signed in 2000 and expiring in 2020). One of the main points of contention is how the EU intends to help African countries achieve economic growth in conjunction with the UNITED Nations Sustainable Development Goals, thereby creating jobs and reducing poverty for their peoples. .
