One. The key, I would say, lies in the question itself. To a large extent, the structure of government has influenced (non)infrastructural development or, in other words, the process of state-building in these enclaves. The central government is not the ultimate authority on local affairs in India. Bangladesh, on the other hand, is not a union, and all decisions seep from the centre to the local. Thus, the formation of the state was faster and relatively less complicated when these enclaves came under the jurisdiction of the state in Bangladesh. In addition, many steps have been taken by the Government of Bangladesh, both formally and informally, to integrate its “new citizens”. An example of the formal agreement could be a special and faster agreement on the registration of landlocked land by the Ministry of Land. In contrast, informal agreements range from verbal instructions to give priority to residents of the enclave of higher authorities to easier access to officials on the ground. [1] Md. Azmeary Ferdoush, Acts of Belonging: The choice of citizenship in the former border enclaves of Bangladesh and India, Political Geography, Volume 70, April 2019, pages 83-91, doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.01.015 A.
Well, the connection with Dahagram-Angorpota through the Tin-Bigha corridor has been important for Bangladesh and India since the Land Border Agreement (LBA) of 1974. The AMLA prepared the documents for the corridor as both sides agreed that Dahagram-Angorpota would not be replaced as Bangladesh would abandon its claim to half of Berubari. The AMLA also hinted that India would lease the corridor to Bangladesh forever. These two factors (the corridor and Dahagram-Angorpota are excluded from the exchange) significantly influenced the idea and rhetoric of citizenship and the sense of belonging of the inhabitants of Dahagram-Angorpota (Cons 2016). Unlike most of their counterparts in other enclaves, their identity and sense of belonging to their homeland was not unclear. However, such a sense and identity was not born in a vacuum. The corridor has become a center of territorial conflict and an incitement to nationalist sentiments in Bangladesh and India. Local and national politicians portrayed the opening of the corridor as a turning point in India`s sovereign rule, while their counterparts in Bangladesh used the same event to bolster nationalist sentiments by portraying India as a “hostile neighbor” (Ferdoush 2019). Such opposing views regarding the corridor and possibly a link to the “continent” through the corridor, rather than blurring, I would say, made the choice of citizenship relatively easy for the residents of Dahagram-Angorpota. The prime ministers of India and Bangladesh signed the Land Borders Accord in 1974 to exchange enclaves and simplify their international borders. A revised version of the agreement was adopted by both countries on 7 May 2015, when the Indian Parliament passed the 100th Amendment to the Indian Constitution. [7] [8] Under this agreement, ratified on June 6, 2015, India received 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (covering an area of 7,110 acres (2,880 ha)) on the Indian mainland, while Bangladesh received 111 Indian enclaves (covering 17,160 acres (6,940 ha)) in mainland Bangladesh.
[9] Residents of the enclave were allowed to continue living in their current location or move to the country of their choice. [10] The exchange of enclaves is expected to take place in phases between July 31, 2015 and June 30, 2016. [11] The enclaves were replaced at midnight on July 31, 2015, and the transfer of the enclave`s residents was completed on November 30, 2015. [12] Under the Land Border Agreement, India lost about 40 square kilometers (15 square miles) to Bangladesh. [13] [14] After the partition of India in 1947, Rangpur was annexed to East Pakistan. The state of Cooch Behar, with its enclaves and holes, was an indigenous state whose Raja had the possibility of joining India or Pakistan. Cooch Behar district was merged with India in 1949. The desire to “decouple” most of the enclaves manifested itself in 1958 in an agreement between Jawaharlal Nehru and Feroz Khan Noon, the respective prime ministers, on an exchange between India and Pakistan, regardless of the loss or gain of territory. But the case then worked in a Supreme Court case in India, and the Supreme Court ruled that a constitutional amendment was needed to transfer the country. Thus, the ninth amendment was introduced to facilitate the implementation of the agreement.
The amendment could not be adopted due to an objection to the transfer of the southern enclave of Berubari. [3] [16] Due to India`s deteriorating relations with Pakistan, the problem is still unresolved. As this agreement was not ratified, negotiations resumed after East Pakistan became independent as Bangladesh in 1971 after the Bangladesh Liberation War. Azmeary`s current project explores how regional change and transformation processes are unfolding in the Arctic, with a focus on Arctic Finland and its adjacent regions funded by the Eudaimonia Institute at the University of Oulu. Although the expected number of people who opted for Indian citizenship in the 111 Indian enclaves of Bangladesh was estimated at about 13,000[16], only 987 people actually chose to retain their Indian citizenship (see Table 1). [17] This was unexpected given the appeal of Indian citizenship among Bangladeshi citizens. It was observed that persons entering Indian territory had left some family members or property in Bangladesh in the hope of returning or moving if necessary. However, as DMO government official Cooch Behar explained, these free movements across the India-Bangladesh border have been restricted. Currently, all return routes are strictly monitored to control illegal immigration. [18] DHAKA (Reuters) – India and Bangladesh signed an agreement on Saturday to simplify their 4,000-kilometer border and clarify the identity of 52,000 people living in enclaves, more than four decades after neighbors first tried to unravel complex territorial rights established in 1713.
The enclaves between India and Bangladesh, also known as chiṭmahals (Bengali: ছিটমহল chiṭmôhôl[1],[2],[3],[4]) and sometimes called Pasha enclaves[5], were the enclaves along the border between Bangladesh and India in Bangladesh and the Indian states of West Bengal, Tripura, Assam and Meghalaya. In the main part of Bangladesh, there were 102 enclaves of Indian territory, which in turn contained 21 Bangladeshi counter-enclaves, one of which contained an Indian counter-enclave – the only third-order enclave in the world. On the Indian mainland, there were 71 Bangladeshi enclaves with 3 Indian counter-enclaves. A 2010 joint census found that 51,549 people lived in these enclaves: 37,334 in Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 14,215 in Bangladeshi enclaves in India. [3] [6] The state government offered each family 100-day work cards as well as jobs at jute factories. The move is meant to be a temporary measure, according to government officials at DMO Cooch Behar. For now, it is intended to provide a source of income for camp residents and help them gain skills in this area. At the same time, it allows them to find other jobs in West Bengal or other parts of India in any sector that suits them. [36] However, camp residents are reluctant to accept this opportunity offered by the government, often under the influence of civil society organizations, supported by both rival political parties and local leaders, who have convinced them of the futility of accepting job offers from the state government.
[37] Male camp residents, under the influence of local leaders, feel that the jobs offered to them in jute factories do not meet their aspirations for a living wage. While living in Bangladesh, they have worked in a variety of professions such as teaching, economics, agriculture and carpentry. [38] They want to be immediately transferred to jobs commensurate with their skills and qualifications. The lack of adequate employment opportunities forced them to look for work on the villagers` land, which contributed to their resentment and sense of marginalization. They would be paid less than their peers when they work in other people`s countries. While in Bangladesh they used to earn 15,000 BDT (~12,000 INR) per month, in India they currently can`t even earn INR 3,000 per month. The 100 days of work that people access per family earned them INR 18,000. But once they exhausted the 100-day work card, they didn`t get a new one. [39] A. I was not at all surprised to see the small number of people in the enclave who chose to settle in India and none in Bangladesh. Although the Indian government expected a large number of people from the Bangladesh enclave to settle in India and provide a budget for it, to its surprise, less than a thousand people eventually moved from Bangladesh to India.
The popular media had predicted that a large number of people from Indian enclaves in Bangladesh would accept Indian citizenship simply because of economic opportunities. However, scientific studies had already predicted that there was less chance for people to move, instead they would stay where they were (Jones 2010, Cons 2016). .
