Finding a way to bring the recalcitrant into the agreement is just one of the delicate tasks that lie ahead. The agreement has also provoked backlash in other parts of the country, where some feel it admits too much importance and offers disproportionately high dividends to Darfur and the two territories. [fn] Interview with a crisis group, Gumaa Kunda, peace adviser to the Prime Minister, Khartoum, 20 October 2020. The five geographical regions or “tracks” are the North, east, the two zones, Darfur and the centre. Interview with The Mohammed Ahmed al-Khatim Crisis Group, representative of Northern Track, Juba, February 8, 2020. The central and northern routes got the least from the government, with Khartoum offering mainly development aid. Abdel Aziz al-Hilu described the agreements on the central and northern routes as “empty”. Interview with Crisis Group, Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, Juba, February 9, 2020. In contrast, the Darfur Protocol requires the government to immediately pay $100 million for development and reconstruction and $750 million per year over ten years to support sustainable development and the implementation of the peace agreement.
Hide footnote The summary and analysis of the IDEA international agreements signed in Juba in August 2020, many of which were part of the final peace agreement, can be found here. Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo signed the document on behalf of the Sudanese government [Akuot Chol/AFP]However, two powerful rebel groups – the Darfur-based faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Abdelwahid Mohamed al-Nour and the People`s Liberation Movement of Northern Sudan (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu – did not sign, reflecting the challenges that the peace process still faces. The Troika also welcomes the agreement on a declaration of principles between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People`s Liberation Movement North/Abdelaziz al-Hilu and encourages both parties to reach an agreement on the end of their conflict so that all Sudanese can participate in the transition process. We continue to call on the Sudan Liberation Movement/Abdulwahid al-Nur to begin talks to achieve a comprehensive peace that includes all major armed movements. The Sudanese government described the Juba peace agreement as the “first phase” of the peace process and the negotiations with al-Hilu and al-Nur as “phase two”. Sudanese Peace Agreement, signed in Juba on 3 October 2020. How the armed groups that signed the Juba peace agreement are integrated into the security services will be crucial. It is crucial that the transitional government does not inflate the security services, thereby further strengthening the military, while exacerbating the country`s fiscal crisis, leaving it without resources to fund other key elements of the agreement and the necessary services. To achieve this and maintain fair representation in the security services, only a certain number of rebels can be accommodated.
The others should be disarmed and supported in their reintegration into civilian life. For this to work, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Hemedtis Rapid Support Forces must be prepared to demobilize some of their men to make room. [fn] It was also noted that the RSF are recruiting massively in 2020, particularly in eastern Sudan. Interview with Crisis Group, Sudanese researcher, Khartoum, 7. October 2020 Hide footnote Further difficult negotiations will be needed to achieve this balance. [fn] The signatories of the rebels were supposed to give their strength to facilitate calculations around the GDR and the integration of fighters, but they have not yet done so. Hide the footnote Nevertheless, the most important factor might be power politics. Some SRF armed groups may share the FFC`s stated hopes for a more inclusive Sudan, but they remain skeptical about the ability of civilians to advance their interests, while seeing them as made up of metropolitan elites that sudanese periphery nationals distrust. Senior SRF officials believe that Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok does not have the influence to bring about transformative change in Sudan and believe they will be better served if they ally with Hemedti, whom they see as the true center of Khartoum`s center of power. [fn] Siddiq Yousef, a Sudanese Communist Party member who led the FFC`s February delegation to Juba, told the Crisis Group that it made sense for SRF representatives to see more logic in allying with the military establishment they expect to maintain a firm grip on power. Interview with the Crisis Group, Siddiq Yousef al-Nour, member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Sudan, Juba, 11 years old. February 2020.Hide the Minnawi footnote, which highlighted the view of several leaders of armed groups that were part of the agreement, that “there is no way for civilians to take control of the state.” [fn] Minnawi said it was “simply crazy” to expect civilians to control a country that was “swimming in arms.” Interview with Crisis Group, Minni Minnawi, Juba, 8 February 2020.
Discussing the possibility of holding credible elections in 2024, another SRF commander said it was not about military influence on the elections, but whether the military allowed elections to be held. Interview with crisis group, SRF commander, Juba, February 8, 2020.Hide footnote Arab Misseriya, indigenous people of the former State of West Kordofan, which has now merged with South Kordofan, are angry because they were not consulted when Agar`s SPLA/M-N faction negotiated with the government on both areas. [fn] Interview with the Crisis Group, US official, Khartoum, October 17, 2020.Interview with the Crisis Group, Om Salama Mohammed, coordinator of the Westkordofan State Coordination Office, Khartoum, October 19, 2020 Hide the footnote Your complaints about the exclusion from the talks could make it difficult to implement the agreement in West Kordofan. In response to the perceived contempt, Members of Misseriya of the People`s Defense Forces, a paramilitary group closely linked to Bashir`s regime, have once again mobilized to push for stronger intergovernmental consultation with Misseriya on their land and resource claims in West Kordofan. [fn] These concerns include Misseriya`s claims to Abyei, a fertile pasture region disputed by South Sudan. .
